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A REPUBLICAN AGENDA FOR HOBBESIAN AMERICA?
Elizabeth Mensch*
Alan Freeman**
What is a state?
Who are the people?
Where resides the ultimate power or sovereignty?
Points of Counsel for Plaintiff in Error, Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 1, 21-22 (1849).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Thomas Jefferson Memorial, on the banks of the Tidal Basin
in East Potomac Park in Washington, D.C., is a circular colonnaded
structure in the simple classical style that Jefferson admired. Inside
the structure stands an imposing 19-foot statue of Jefferson on a 6-foot
pedestal. The statue depicts Jefferson before the committee appointed
by the Continental Congress to write the Declaration of Independence.
Engraved on the interior walls of the memorial are four inscriptions
based on the writings of our third president. The U.S. Park Service
explains:
On the southwest wall are famous and inspiring phrases from
the Declaration of Independence. It is appropriate that these
words should occupy the first position in the sequence. It
was Jefferson's wish that he be remembered first as the
author of this most famed of American documents.'
Looking to the southwest wall, one reads the following:
WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS TO BE SELF-EVIDENT:
THAT ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL, THAT THEY

*Professor of Law, SUNY/Buffalo School of Law; B.A., 1965, New Sch. for Social Research;
M.A.T., 1967, Cornell; J.D., 1978, Buffalo; LL.M., 1979, Harvard.
**Professor of Law, SUNY/Buffalo School of Law; A.B., 1964, Brown Univ.; LL.B., 1967,
New York University.
The authors wish to dedicate this essay to Al Katz, who taught us never to take anything for
granted. We are also grateful to Greg Alexander, Errol Meidinger, Gary Minda, Rob Steinfeld,
and Gary Peller for their for helpful comments and advice.
1. Brochure from National Park Service, Dep't of the Interior (1986) (describing the Thomas
Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C.).
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ARE ENDOWED BY THEIR CREATOR WITH CERTAIN INALIENABLE RIGHTS, AMONG THESE ARE
LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS,
THAT TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS GOVERNMENTS
ARE INSTITUTED AMONG MEN. WE ...SOLEMNLY
PUBLISH AND DECLARE, THAT THESE COLONIES
ARE AND OF RIGHT OUGHT TO BE FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES ... AND FOR SUPPORT OF THIS
DECLARATION, WITH A FIRM RELIANCE ON THE
PROTECTION OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE, WE MUTUALLY PLEDGE OUR LIVES,
OUR FORTUNES, AND
2
OUR SACRED HONOR.

The first sentence seems to end too curtly. Moreover, what is depicted
as the beginning of the next sentence hardly seems to follow from the
first, serving to insult Jefferson's rhetorical prowess.
In the original document, however, the first sentence does not end
with the phrase "instituted among men," but goes on to say:
that to secure these rights, governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government ....
3
Space constraints surely limited the text that could be inscribed on
the memorial wall. Most of the document is in fact missing. Yet this
particular editorial excision reveals the political tradition and consciousness that secured hegemonic status in post-Revolutionary
America, especially those years following ratiflcation of the Constitution. It is hardly surprising that the text inscribed on the marble wall
does not celebrate the revolutionary potential associated with a living,
continuing, popular sovereignty. After all, the dedication of the
Thomas Jefferson Memorial occurred in 1943, not 1776.
It has become fashionable among contemporary elite legal scholars
to seek to "recover," under the banner of something called "republicanism," a living, breathing version of participatory popular sovereignty. Such scholars, while not actually deploying the people themselves, seek to legitimize the rhetorical availability of popular
sovereignty for purposes of constitutional law interpretation. 4 Their
2. Id.
3.

G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

374-79 (1978) (indicating the quoted passage in both Jefferson's original and the version corrected
by Congress).
4. Instead of responding directly to Professor Michelman's essay, we offer a more
generalized response to the current effort in legal scholarship to 'revive" republicanism, an
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argument depends upon the existence of an identifiable, recoverable
tradition through which we might resuscitate the dormant voice of
the people so as to breathe new life into the otherwise shaky and
stumbling discourse of liberal constitutionalism.
This essay will suggest that those who did the editorial work for
the Jefferson Memorial got it right and that the best way to understand
the role of popular sovereignty in American constitutional culture is
through the lens of Thomas Hobbes: with the ratification of the Constitution, the American people irretrievably alienated their
sovereignty, surrendering to institutionalism. Against that background, we will suggest that popular sovereignty plays a role in American culture much more ideological than real. As with any successful
ideology, its utopian core might serve as the basis for an alternative
political vision. Developing that core, however, requires not just a
superficial and selective recovery of slogans nonthreatening to contemporary liberal consciousness, but a hard look at the issues, once central
to the republican tradition, that must be addressed by those seeking
to develop a participatory and communitarian political alternative.
II.

HOBBESIAN AMERICA

The core dilemma of political theory is the legitimacy of authority. 5
In our contemporary political culture, one takes for granted the notion
that ultimate authority, or sovereignty, rests with 'the people." This,
however, is a fiction, of relatively modern origin, arising specifically
and dialectically in reaction to the6 well-established model of legitimate
authority residing in the Crown.

effort spearheaded by Professor Michelman. Our essay thus is directly responsive to the most
recent such expressions: Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter
Michelman, Law's Republic], and Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988). We also are implicitly considering Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American
Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987), and Michelman, Possession vs.
Distributionin the ConstitutionalIdea of Property, 72 IowA L. REV.1319 (1987) [hereinafter
Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution].
5. See, e.g., C. HILL, The Problem ofAuthority, in 2 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF CHRISTOPHER HILL 37-50 (1986). A legacy of the Reformation is the continuing struggle between
"external," "arbitrary" authority and '"nternal" authority. Id. at 47. One can test the validity
of internal authority only "in discussion with other believers." Id.
6. For a recent and masterful treatment of popular sovereignty as fiction, with an emphasis
on the ideological importance of the disputes between crown and parliament, see generally E.
MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE. OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND

AND AMERICA (1988).
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The scholastic natural law model, fondly adopted by the Stuarts
in seventeenth-century England, rested upon the supposed unity of

virtue and authority. A sovereign king, who ruled by divine right in
the name of God, embodied the divinely implanted faculty of reason.
Within each individual, reason brought order but of the chaos of disparate sense impression and errant appetite, freeing the soul to ascend
the ladder of pure speculation. So too, in civil society, the sovereign's
reason brought harmony to the chaos of historic particularity and
human instability, so that earthly society could reflect the harmonious

purity of the city of God.7

In seventeenth-century England, the most dramatic challenge to

this hierarchical model was the radical puritanism that located
sovereignty, and, hence, legitimate authority, directly in the people
themselves.8 If the king (at least in his natural body) spoke for God
in a flawed voice, who else but the people could audaciously claim to
be his true representative? The Parliamentarians, all too eager to
establish legislative supremacy, saw in the demise of divine right an
opportunity to relocate legitimate authority in their representative

7. See Cassirer, Nature and Grace in Medieval Philosophy, in THE MYTH OF THE STATE
106-15 (1946). The natural law tradition emphasized the link between reason and a just rule.
See, e.g., 0. GIERKE, 1 NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500-1800, at 36-38
(E. Barker trans. 1957) (on relation of reason to authority); C. MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST 112-14 (1932) (discussing basis in Roman theory); L.
STRAUS & J. CROPSEY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 243 (2d ed. 1972) (on Thomistic
emphasis). Consistency with reason rendered a soveriegn's command "lawful":
But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law,
it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be
understood that saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise
the sovereign's will would savour of lawlessness rather than of law.
8 T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PART II, at 3 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans. 3d ed. 1942); see 0. GIERKE, supranote 7, at 40-45; A. MCGRADE, POLITICAL THOUGHT
OF WILLIAM OF OCKHAm 157-59 (1974) (discussing whether the pursuit of the common good
is limited only by divine gift or further limited by human law); C. MCILWAIN, supra note 7,
at 194-97 (although the King, too, is restrained by law, no effective machinery existed to make
this a practical reality).
8. For a recent excursion to the religio-political struggles of the period and an introduction
to the Levellers, Ranters, and Diggers, see C. HILL, A TINKER AND A POOR MAN: JOHN
BUNYAN AND HIS CHURCH 1628-1988, at 1-27, 75-84, 90-99, 170-93 (1989). See also D. LITrLE,
RELIGION, ORDER AND LAW: A STUDY IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY ENGLAND 33-131 (1969)
(presenting the theological basis for a radical "new order" political direction in Puritan thought);
G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 114-18 (1969) (explicitly
linking American republicanism to Puritan evangelical zeal, quoting the revealing words of
Samuel Adams, who predicted that America would be "the Christian Sparta.").

A REPUBLICAN AGENDA

selves.9 The more radical Puritans, however, did not see their representatives as having any more claim than had the king to speak with
the uncorrupted voice of God. As if by default, then, sovereignty
descended to the people, now obligated to speak in their own name.
For the most radical Puritans, this obligation was an occasion for
celebration, for only the voice of the people, unmediated by political
or ecclesiastical hierarchy, could speak for God. In this context, the
radicals fashioned a participatory politics that was at once millennial
and egalitarian. The republicanism of seventeenth-century England,
even in its most theoretical and scholarly form, merged the civic
humanism of Machiavelli with millennial Christianity in a manner that

might cause some embarrassment to modern, secular constitutional
law scholars seeking to recover the republican tradition. "The voice
of the people is the voice of God," Harrington announced, by which
he meant something more complex and profound than the occasional

insertion of "deliberation" into the political process.10
Thomas Hobbes found little cause for celebration in the excitement
of radical puritanism. For Hobbes, the demise of royalism invited no
new unity of a people speaking in their own name in a state of near
grace, but rather, an awesome, conflictual atomization. 11 Against a

9. E. MORGAN, supra note 6, at 65. For a full historic discussion, see generally, id. at
17-77. Morgan shows that parliamentarians initially claimed to accept the divine right of kings,
insisting only that the king in his natural body had been corrupted by evil aides. Id. Because
"the king in his body politic always wanted what was best for his subjects, all his subjects, and
surely no subject could know better what that was than the combined representatives of all his
subjects, the king was obligated to listen to the advice of Commons." Id. at 30. See also E.
KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY

(1957).
10. Harrington, The Prerogative of Popular Government, in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF
JAMES HARRINGTON 391 (J. Pocock ed. 1977). In his extraordinary introduction to Harrington's
work, Pocock emphasizes the extent to which Harrington must be understood in relation to
Christianity as well as the more secular civic humanist tradition that Pocock himself described
in J. POCOCK, THE MACHIEVELLIAN MOMENT (1975) [hereinafter J. POCOCK, MACHIEVELLIAN MOMENT]. See generally Pocock, Foreword to J. HARRINGTON, THE POLITICAL WORKS
OF JAMiES HARRINGTON (J. Pocock ed. 1977). This is not to suggest, however, that Harrington
advocated that clerics enjoy political power or privilege. In their anticlericalism, Hobbes and
Harrington were actually allies.
11. See Shulman, Hobbes, Puritans, and Promethean Politics, in 16 POL. THEORY 426,
437 (1988). This piece suggests that it was Hobbes' mission in Leviathan, infra note 12, to
devalue the rebels' political and religious speech through "systematic reductionism" to "depoliticize them and keep them private: His redefinitions of their key concepts separates them
from God, each other, and their own experiences, to deprive them of the grounds to rebel."
Id. at 437. His goal was:
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background of what he perceived as factious, turbulent discord,
Hobbes sought a scientific basis for legitimate authority that would offer
security in place of the vagaries of mischievous rebellion. In so seeking, however, he wanted firmer intellectual ground than the pretentious scholasticism traditionally invoked on behalf of monarchy. The
resultant effort alienated both rebels and royalists. Rebels found their
ardent millennial fervor reduced to base, irrational self-interest, while
royalists found scant solace in a merciless pragmatism that defended
their monarchy only when and because it worked.
With a ruthlessness that alarmed even his fellow royalists, 13 Hobbes
demolished all of the intellectual categories which once seemed to
legitimitize power. He impatiently dismissed as fictions the intricate
"faculties" which had characterized scholastic epistemology. In so
doing, he also rejected dualisms implicit in the scholastic account; no
wonderful process existed by which the mind could translate the particularity of matter into the universality of form. According to Hobbes,
a mathematician and one of the first philosophers of modern scientific
positivism, the mind was no more than a continuation of a perpetually
moving physical world, incapable of knowing anything not part of that
world. In particular, knowledge of any supposed "good" or "evil" was
impossible. Such words were just inflated terms people used to describe motions in their bodies by which they were either drawn or
repulsed by external objects. Hobbes, in fact, offered more concrete
substitute terms - appetite and aversion - which lacked misleading

[t~o deprive people of the grounds that made judgment of conventions, and thus
revolt, possible: If ideas of God and conscience are merely private and subjective
fancies, they are incapable of being publicly shared or rationally defended, cannot
provide warrantable grounds by which to criticize prevailing practices, and cannot
sustain an alternative form of order.
Id. at 438.
12. For some of the controversies surrounding the exact meaning of Hobbes' work, see
generally K. BROWN, HOBBES STUDY (1965) (showing the range of controversy as to interpretation of Hobbes); M. REIK, THE GOLDEN LANDS OF THOMAS HOBBES (1977); J. WATKINS,
HOBBES' SYSTEM OF IDEAS: A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PHILOSOPHIC
THEORIES (1973) (further illustrating range of interpretation). But cf. Plamenatz, Foreword to
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN at 9 (Plamenatz ed. 1963) ('Tart of the fascination of Hobbes is that,
though he makes large demands on us, we can always come to grips with him. He does not,
as Rousseau and Burke, Hegel and Marx, so often do, elude us.").
13. As Richard Chamberland said: "Whilst Mr. Hobbes with one hand speciously offers up
to kings and monarchs royal gifts and privileges, he with the other, treacherously plunges a
dagger into their hearts." J. WATKINS, supra note 12, at 49; see also E. MORGAN, supra note
6, at 79 n.2. As Morgan points out, Hobbes left "little room for divine right on the one hand
or popular sovereignty, as usually conceived, on the other." Id. His influence on the "growth
of those fictions," lay chiefly in "simple revulsion" to his arguments. Id.
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value content and thus posed starkly the problem of relativity. When
people used the word "good," they referred only to what stimulated

their own appetite:
For these words of Good, Evill . . . , are ever used with
relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing
simply and absolutely so; not any common Rule of Good and
Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves;
but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-

wealth). 14
14. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, pt. I, ch. VI, at 41 (A. Lindsay ed. 1950). The link between
epistemology, especially scholastic faculty psychology, and conceptions of law and politics cannot
be overemphasized. We still, often unwittingly, live with the consequences. See R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 29-62 (1975). Hobbes represents a dramatic breakdown in scholastic
theory, yet scholastic theory was fraught with core dilemmas at its inception, and its demolition
already had begun. Scholastics had tried to reconcile theories of knowledge which remained
stubbornly at odds with each other. To simplify: The dualism at the heart of the Platonic outlook
implied an irrevocable separation between the sensible, changing world of phenomenal appearance and the eternal world of ideas. The particular can never partake of the absolute. In the
language of Christianity, Platonism meant that the distance between God and the sensible world
was forever unbridgeable through finite and intermediary steps. Aristotelianism, however, offered no sharp break between matter and form. Both were part of a single developing reality,
part of a process by which form continuously flows from unmoved matter to all parts of a
self-contained whole.
For a time, especially with the influence of Neoplatonism, the two systems seemed to merge.
As Cassirer describes it, "t]he Platonic category of transcendence and the Aristotelian category
of development mate to produce the bastard concept of 'emanation."' E. CASSIRER, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COSMOS IN RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY 18 (1964). Emanation was a kind
of overflow of the absolute to produce a full universe of mediate beings. Thus occurred the
flowering (especially during the Elizabethan period, when the whole cosmology was nearing
collapse) of elaborate analogies that drew the universe as a vast set of macrocosms and microcosms, all arranged on planes leading from lowest to highest. Hence, the king, who exercised
his sovereign reason, ruled a harmonious kingdom just as reason brought harmony to the soul of
an individual. Within this system, reason functioned to ascend the cosmological ladder, achieving
higher and higher levels of speculative knowledge. Jurisprudence was close to theology on this
ladder, near the top, as rooted in eternal, rational principle. Medicine, with its unethereal
involvement with bodies, was clearly lower. Id. at 142 n.16.
Of course, the notion of custom as law raised a hard dilemma, for custom was particular
and disparate rather than universal. For a complete meditation on that problem, see ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (1520) (Selden Soc. reprint). At one crucial point, where the law
of reason evaluates maxims based on custom, St. German almost connects the law of reason to
custom, but then refuses to do so definitely, stating only that the whole relation of reason to
custom is "very harde and of great diffycultie to knowe, and though it be harde to dyscuss...
very necessary to be knowen for the ... reason of the law." Id. at 69.
A core question was exactly how knowledge, if based on the senses (as Aristotle said), still
could be linked to a speculative understanding that transcended mere matter. How did the
mind, as Sir John Davies noted, "from things particular... abstract the universall kinds."?
K. WALLACE, FRANCIS BACON ON THE NATURE OF MAN 104 (1967) (quoting Sir John Davies).
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Thus all definition of value is particularized. No knowledge of universal moral truth lurks in the understanding; no access to pure speculation exists that transcends matter. This Hobbesian world of utter
multiplicity prevents any natural unity of "the People:" the only unity
possible is the artificial unity of the state ("this our Artificiall Man
the commonwealth"). 15 Of necessity, people transfer power to the state
to pursue whatever draws their appetites, which means the right to
define what is just or unjust. To preserve peace, sovereignty replaces
the absolute moral standard which otherwise does not exist: 'Would
man to every other man allege for law his own particuyou have every
16
lar reason?'
The very artificiality of the state makes the people's alienation of
sovereignty complete. Without artificial unity there is only chaos of
multiplicity; and moral multiplicity cannot yield a unified demand for
a more natural community. The people can never speak in their own
name.
In a fashion that parallels Hobbes' response to what he perceived
as the utter chaos of Puritan radicalism, the American constitutionalists responded to what they perceived as a chaos of multiplicity unleashed by the Revolution and permitted to fester in the
1780s, when power still rested chiefly in the states. The period between

Some, for example, said that before the imagination could present sense impressions to Reason,
those impressions were "enlightened with the Light of the Understanding, and purged from
the sensible and singular conditions, which they retain in the Imagination." With that purging,
they came to represent "generalr' rather than "particular" things and could therefore be "imbraced by the Understanding." P. MILLER, I THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY 241 (1939) (quoting an anonymous Renaissance writer). That process, however carefully described by reference to particular faculties, ultimately was shrouded in mystery. Hence,
scholars commonly assumed that some higher forms of knowledge were innate in Reason, knowable without stimulation by the concrete world of experience.
Even before Hobbes, scholastic nominalists had implicitly rejected scholastic epistemology
by simply declaring God to be unknowable through the usual methods of human reasoning, and
the Puritan emphasis on faith and grace had much the same effect. Francis Bacon, too, had
emphasized that there was nothing "impious" in relegating religion to faith and thereby substituting direct knowledge of matter for the abstract speculation of the scholastics. Bacon somewhat
modified faculty psychology, assuming that sense impressions directly contacted the intellectual
faculties. He also sharply separated understanding from reason, but continued to assume that
understanding, at least, contains the seeds of divinely implanted conscience and vestiges of
Adam's pure knowledge. Along with imagination, its subpart, however, understanding's conclusions needed to be confined and measured by the standard of matter. That reversal marks a
revolution in thought. Nevertheless, Bacon was still far from the reductionism of Hobbes. For
these points and the complexity of Bacon's epistemology, see generally J. STEPHENS, FRANCIS
BACON AND THE STYLE OF SCIENCE (1975); K. WALLACE, supra.
15.
16.

T. HOBBES, supra note 14, pt. II, ch. XXVI, at 230.
Id. at 225.
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the Revolution and the Constitution represented a crisis for both political theory and social stability. 17 Earnest republican theorists in
America, the elite whig intelligentsia, had expected that, within the
relative homogeneity of the states, interests would be unified and the
people wisely would choose as leaders these broad-minded "natural
aristocrats" who were the fit representatives of a republican people.
Instead, representatives from the new, narrowly-carved districts
proved to be stubbornly wedded to the specific concerns, prejudices,
and sometimes corruptions of their own particular areas. Moreover,
they seemed to lack that more expansive conception of the universal
good which gave stability to government. Even state senates, like the
lower houses, allowed sectional interests to prevail, providing no aristocratic check on "irresponsible" popular legislation. America's state
legislatures, the most democratic bodies in Western history, passed
laws that violated the treaty with Great Britain, provided expansive
debt relief, confiscated property, authorized paper money, refused to
pay for national expenses, etc. Such laws, enacted, repealed, and
reenacted with an alarming haste, seemed irrefutable evidence that
anarchy prevailed - an anarchy that had the force of law and was
therefore tyranny as well.
These new representatives were also of a decidedly lesser social
standing than those whom more respectable Whigs expected to find
in positions of influence. "When the pot boils the scum will rise,"' 18
James Otis had warned in 1776, and his prediction came true with a
vengeance. The egalitarianism implicit in republican theory became
too much the political reality, so that a man fit only "to patch a shoe"
might actually feel qualified to "patch the state," "fancying himself a
Solon or Lycurgus."'19 Everywhere "[sipecious, interested designing
men," "men respectable neither for their property, their virtue, nor
their abilities," were becoming leaders, courting "the suffrages of the
people by tantalizing them with improper indulgences." 20 This was not
responsible republicanism, but the unchecked ascent of an alarmingly
unvirtuous rabble.
Moreover, during the post-Revolutionary period Americans continued to show a disconcerting readiness for direct action, reseizing,
as it were, sovereignty from their institutional representatives and

17. See generally E. MORGAN, supra note 6, at 237; G. WOOD, supra note 8; Appleby,
The Amierican Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited, 74 J. Am. HIST. 798 (1987).

18. G. WOOD, supra note 8,at 476.
19.
20.

Id. at 477.
Id.
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locating it, once again, in the "people out of doors. ' 121 Crowds assembled
to challenge or supplement state legislation, local communities organized to suppress Tories or curb profiteers, and even interstate
conventions formed to demand, for example, lower prices for necessities. Shay's Rebellion in Western Massachusetts in 1787 confirmed
the conservatives' grimmest predictions: Republican liberty meant
nothing but endless, anarchic upheaval. 22
Those like Professor Michelman, who now seek to read deliberative
republicanism into the Constitution, forget the extent to which the
choice for constitutionalism was explicitly a choice againstthe dangers
of local participatory democracy and a choice for a broad national
structure of carefully counterpoised institutions designed to filter out
factious, local particularism. A close reading of Federalist No. 10, for
example, shows that Madison had no faith in the people as careful,
reasoned deliberators. 23 No less than Hobbes, Madison saw people as
driven by passions, with reason too closely linked to passion to provide
a dependable check on human appetite. Passion lay at the root of
faction - chiefly, the passion for economic gain, but sometimes, for
political or religious rivalry instead - and it was unbridled faction
24
which threatened to undermine the young republic.
Madison's solution was not to institute republicanism as the voice
of a more localized, deliberative people. By the late 1780s the "people"
already had proved themselves unworthy. No locality seemed small
enough to speak with a unified voice; everywhere, unity was dissolving
into a Hobbesian nightmare of multiplicity, with democratic legislation
representing nothing more than an aggregation of unreason and faction. Therefore, instead of celebrating the process of local republican
deliberation, Madison quite dramatically turned republicanism on its
head. No doubt following David Hume, he argued that decency in
government would result from an expanded (i.e., national) territory

21. Id. at 319. For the tendency toward direct action, see E. MORGAN, supra note 6, at
257; G. WOOD, supra note 8, at 323-28.
22. For an excellent analysis of Shay's Rebellion and its continuing meaning for American
constitutional culture, see generally Appleby, supra note 17.
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 53 (J. Madison) (E.Earle ed. 1937); see also Adair, That
Politics May Be Reduced to a Science: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist,
in THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 487 (J. Greene ed. 1968);
Lovejoy, The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the Method of
Counterpoise, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 469 (J. Greene
ed. 1968).
24. See Lovejoy, supra note 23, at 476-78; see also S. BOWLES & H. GINTIS, DEMOCRACY
AND CAPITALISM 51-55

(1987).
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and a federal institutional structure that stifled faction and filtered
democratic passion out of public life. Hume's oft-quoted statement on
the subject, taken to be Madison's inspiration, is revealing:
In a large government, which is modelled with masterly
skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy from the lower people,

. . .

to the higher magistrates,

who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts
are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by
intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measures against the public interest.2
According to Madison, the constitutional goal was not simply to
create a standoff of inevitably conflicting interests. A balance of powers meant that no factious majorities would be able to take control,
as they had in the state legislatures. Nevertheless, Madison still believed in a unified conception of the public good. The real advantage
of the Constitutional scheme lay in the anticipated "substitution of
representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments ren2
der them superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustice." 6
In a federal scheme, power would more likely rest with "men who
possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters," men elevated above the clamors of men "of factious
tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs."
Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists understood the extent to
which the Constitution was an attempt to return government to the
hands of the natural aristocrats.2 In a sense, however, this faith in
the "natural" aristocrat was merely a fragile attempt to mediate between the chaos of true democracy and the bleak landscape of fullfledged Hobbesian realism, with its consequent surrender to the artificiality of positivist institutionalism. A more critical step was to discern how "the people," the only authoritative basis for ultimate political
legitimacy, could have deployed their sovereignty while simultaneously
recasting themselves as a set of federal institutions forever beyond
their own immediate control. Direct national elections lent some factual
credence to the fiction of popular sovereignty, but Hamilton's famous
argument for judicial review, in Federalist No. 782 later given rhetor-

ical flourish by John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,30 became the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Adair, supra note 23, at 494; see also, G. WOOD, supra note 8, at 504.
G. WOOD, supra note 8,at 505.
Id.
Id. at 506-18.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 502 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1937).

30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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real cornerstone of American constitutionalism, regarded not merely
as a Hobbesian covenant, but as a kind of political transubstantiation.
Both in its form ('We the people . . . do ordain and establish")
and mode of ratification (the state conventions) the Constitution ex-

pressed popular will, not in an ordinary text, but a legal one. As a
legal text, it was not susceptible of interpretation by common sense
- that natural reason now located in the sovereign people rather than
in the Crown - but only through the peculiar artificial reason of those
learned in the lawA1 As Hamilton emphatically stated:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar

province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must
be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore
32
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning .....
John Marshall made exactly the same claim in Marbury: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what
the law is. ' a The people, in other words, through the constitutional
text, alienated their active sovereignty to a set of structured institu-

31. Coke, of course, claimed the authority of "artificial reason" against King James's assertion
of royal prerogative in the name of "natural reason." 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (K.B. 1608); see
also CONSTITUTION

AND THE FEUDAL LAW: ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVEN-

30-55 (1967); J. POCOCK, MACHIEVELLIAN MOMENT, s-upra note 10, at
16. From the natural law tradition of descending authority James was surely correct; only the
ascending notion of consent over time gave credence to Coke's claim, given the problematic
authority of "custom" as law. With the shift of sovereignty from the king to the "people" came
a shift in the location of reason as well.
Conventional thought at the time, including that of Hobbes, understood the conceptual link
between reason and sovereignty. Thomas Paine, for one, was perfectly comfortable with that
connection and endlessly hailed the natural reason of the people, their "Common Sense." Unlike
Madison, however, he also believed that the "people" should retain the right of direct participation, "forming or reforming, generating or regenerating constitutions and governments," T.
PAINE, The Rights of Man, in II THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 397 (M. Conway ed.
1967) (1894). Paine envisioned a right to sovereignty not monopolized by any generation, one
not encumbered by any conditions. Id. at 452. Similarly, Paine had no respect for legal precedent,
which he saw as simply a substitute for faith in human reason. Id. at 441. Nor did he approve
of careful institutional arrangements designed to "balance" powers, since they, too, removed
government from direct accountability to the people. Id. at 383-85.
Paine, in other words, represents the complete relocation of sovereign reason, so that it
really did rest with the "people." Notably, the Federalists were determined to locate "reason,"
not with the people directly (whom they described as passionate, not reasonable), but with the
judicial process of textual interpretation. So, too, the Federalists separated the exercise of
"rights" from both reason and consent, a more dramatic departure from tradition than we now
realize.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 506 (Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1937).
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
TEENTH CENTURY
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tions subject to judicial oversight. In subsequent years, the Supreme
Court confirmed three key features of the sovereignty that had been
thoroughly institutionalized: the irrevocability of its alienation, its
nationalization, and its subordination to privatized rights.
Alienation was a clearly once-and-for-all affair:4 The people lost
all right to any exercise of power not confined by institutional forms.
This point, implicit in Marbury, was confirmed by Luther v. Borden,35
which dealt quite summarily with an actual instance of an extra-institutional assertion of popular sovereignty (in other words, direct republicanism). A large group of Rhode Islanders, led by conservative
lawyer Thomas Dorr, still believed in peaceable revolution through
popular will. This group actually held an extra-institutional election
to ratify a new, more democratic, state constitution to replace the
36
seventeenth-century charter under which Rhode Island still operated.
Central to their claim was that the highest sovereign authority was
the voice of the people themselves. Dorr's group received a dramatic
electoral victory throughout the state, from which they naively believed they could derive authority for a new government. Instead,
they were ruthlessly suppressed by the (existing) Charter Government, which declared martial law. An invasion of the home of a Dorrite
pursuant to that martial law offered the factual setting for a legal
challenge to the continuing legitimacy of the Charter Government
following the successful ratification of the People's Constitution.
The Supreme Court flatly refused to question the legitimacy of the
Charter Government, making clear at the outset that the legitimacy
of the existing state government lay in its ability to prevail.37 That con-

34. For a similar argument, see Miller, The Ghostly Body Politic: The Federalist Papers
and PopularSovereignty, 16 POL. THEORY 99 (1988). Miller's article, based on careful reading
of The FederalistPapers, distinguishes the ideological form, "popular sovereignty," implicit in
the Federalist theory from "democracy," which is direct and participatory. See generally id.

Michelman seemingly scurries from Miller's argument, dismissing it in a footnote as "obvious
hyperbole." Mlichelman, Law's Republic, supra note 4, at 1500 n.23. He later characterizes it

as "the most extreme account," which would amount to thinking "luridly" about the framers.
Id. at 1509.
35. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
36. For a thoughtful and sophisticated account of the Dorr war and its political and legal
aftermath, including Luther v. Bordon, see generally G. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON TRIAL 1831-1861 (1976) (arguing that the suppression of the Dorr rebellion,

confirmed by the Supreme Court with a vengeance in Luther, marked the final demise of any
living theory of "peaceable revolution" in American political life, ironically setting the stage for
the Civil War). For further commentary on the historical events, see generally M. GETTLEMAN,
THE DORR REBELLION: A STUDY IN AMERICAN RADIcALISm, 1833-1849 (1973).

37. See 48 U.S. at 38-42.
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clusory treatment of the issue left no room for any theory of peaceable
revolution, for any expression of popular sovereignty neither institutionally confined nor militarily successful. Then, in a move often regarded as the origin of the modern "political question" doctrine, the
Court went on to relegate the "republican form of government" clause
of the Constitution to the institutional competence (or will) of Congress
and the president,8 leaving no substantive route by which the people
could directly express their sovereignty outside of the constitutional
distribution of spheres of authority.
An important feature of the people's one-time alienation of
sovereignty, true to Madison's goal, was the subordination of that
sovereignty to a nationalized regime of privatized rights to be secured
by institutionalized judicial power. State governments, once thought
the natural successors to the republican city/state tradition, were not
so regarded by the Supreme Court. Thus, when the Georgia legislature
tried to recapture, through legislative repeal, some thirty-five million
acres of public land that the previous legislature, via an outright
bribery led by one of Georgia's United States senators, corruptly had
deeded to speculators, the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck,39 invoked the supremacy of the national
constitution to annul Georgia's assertion of its own state sovereignty.
As the basis for his decision, Marshall, again borrowing from Hamilton, 40 deployed a deft blend of natural law, selective analogy to English
common law, and positivist interpretation of constitutional text via
the contract clause. In Fletcher, the people of Georgia found themselves reprising in the particular case the one-time alienation of
sovereignty represented by the Constitution itself. Once alienated (literally), their sovereignty over the vast tract of public land in question
(more than the entire state of Mississippi) became the institutional
property of the national government to be reserved by its judiciary
(albeit in the name of the people, A la Marbury) for the protection of
its rights-bearing purchasers.
Despite such setbacks, some, like John C. Calhoun, argued that
the Constitution was no more than a compact among the several states,

38. Id. at 43.
39. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). For the full story on the bribery, corruption, and political
struggle behind, and the eventual litigation of this case, see generally C. MCGRATH, YAzoo:
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1966). For an interpretation of Fletcher v. Peck
similar to ours, see Nedelsky, Book Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 340, 356-57 (1982).
40. Hamilton wrote an opinion letter shortly after the Georgia repeal legislation. The memo,
written many years earlier, bears strong resemblance to Marshall's argument in Fletcher. See
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 87. The memo is reprinted in C. MCGRATH, supra note 39, at
149-50.
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granting certain powers in trust to the federal government, as the
states' agent.41 Justices Marshall and Story2 strived to undercut that
view, treating sovereignty as residing in the people as a whole when
they ratified the Constitution, not as something still residing in particular states. Remembering from Marbury who gets to speak "for the
people," consider the irony in Marshall's assertion of popular
sovereignty as against the states in the following excerpt from his
classic opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.43 The passage, which is an
elaboration of Hamiltonian political theory,4 bears on the merits of
the case only insofar as it undercuts the competency of Maryland as
a state to speak with special authority in interpreting the Constitution:
In discussing this question, the counsel for The State of
Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the constitution, to consider that instrument not
as emanating from the people, but as the act of sovereign
and independent States. The powers of the general government, it has been said, are delegated by the States, who
alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme dominion 5s
It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. The Convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by
the State Legislatures. But the instrument, when it came
from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation,
or pretensions to it. It was reported to the then existing
Congress of the United States, with a request that it might
"be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each
State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of
its Legislature, for their assent and ratification. '' 46 This mode

41. See A. SPAIN, THE POLITIcAL THEORY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 189-201 (1968); see
also J. CALHOUN, A Disquisition of Government, in CALHOUN: BASIc DocuMrENTS 27 (J.
Anderson ed. 1952).
42. For the crucial role after 1829 of both Story in particular and the Harvard Law School
in general in securing hegemony for the conservative, nationalist constitutionalism within the
peculiar interpretative province of the judiciary, see Newmyer, Harvard Law School, New
England Legal Culture, and the Antebellum Origins of American Jurisprudence, 74 J. Am.
HIsT. 814 (1987). With the recent ascension of conservative Robert Clark to its deanship, one
might safely suppose that Harvard Law School has now returned to its historic mission of
serving as an energetic and active apologist for the existing order.
43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
44. For the substance of Marshall's McCulloch argument, see A. HAMILTON, Opinion as
to the Constitutionalityof the Bank of United States, in IV THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 104-38 (J. Hamilton ed. 1850) (1791).
45. 17 U.S. at 402.
46. Id. at 403 (quoting from previously quoted passage).
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of proceeding was adopted; and by the Convention, by Congress, and by the State Legislatures, the instrument was
submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only
manner in which they can act safely, effectively, and wisely,
on such a subject, by assembling in Convention. It is true,
they assembled in their several States - and where else
should they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever
wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people
into one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they
act in their States. But the measures they adopt do not, on
that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State governments.
From these Conventions the constitution derives its
whole authority. The government proceeds directly from the
people; is ordained and established in the name of the people;
and is declared to be ordained, "in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic tranquility,
and secure the blessings of Liberty" to themselves and to
their posterity. 47 The assent of the States, in their sovereign
capacity, is implied in calling a Convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at
perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final.
It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived,
by the State governments. The constitution, when thus
adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the State
sovereignties . ...
The government of the Union, then, (whatever may be
the influence of this fact on the case,) is, emphatically, and
truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance
it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them,
and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their ben48
efit.
Thus, Marshall named the people as authors of their own destiny, yet
left them estranged from government, in the hands of an impersonal
institutional structure.
The point of describing our constitutional structure as "Hobbesian"
is not simply to get the label right, especially on a historical issue as
elusive as "intent." Rather, the description clarifies reality, for American political life is at least partly a creature of the presuppositions
about both public and private life that were built into American con-

47.
48.

Id. at 403-04 (quoting U.S. CONST. preamble).
Id. at 402-05.
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stitutionalism. That is a point often missed by the pluralist/empiricist
strand of American political science.
Robert Dahl, for example, has described politics as naturally and
inevitably situated in processes of influence, by which particular individuals promise reward or threaten punishment to induce other self-interested individuals to act. 49 Like Hobbes's, Dah's view is positivist
and mechanistic; he describes the notions of influence as "very similar
to those on which the idea of force rests in mechanics." 50 He conceives
politics to be universally a relation between particular self-interested

individuals, and offers no way of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate "influence," for all values are subjective. Dahl adopts a Hobbesian
impatience with normative language or moral argument, dismissing
any possibility of a shared conception of public good. Both inequality
and conflict are unavoidable; the function of government is to provide
an institutional structure to contain and manage conflict. While this
may be an accurate description of American political life, the scientific
naivete lies in supposing that this Hobbesian reality is a description

49. See F. COLEMAN, HOBBES AND AMERICA: EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 154-56 (1977) (viewing American constitutionalism as essentially Hobbesian, effectively

pointing to Dahl as an example of the empiricist fallacy). Coleman's is a biting critique of the
failure of American politics to cope with the evident shortcomings in American life. Id.
This version does not represent Dahl's recent work, which is more sophisticated and insightful.
See, e.g., R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND EQUALITY (1986); R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL (1982); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985).

For efforts of modern political scientists to grapple seriously with problems of democracy,
see, e.g., J. BURNHEIM, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE? (1985); J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980); E. Meidinger, Regulatory Culture and Democratic Theory (1987)
(working paper, Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy).

For an argument that Madisonian constitutionalism did not repudiate traditional republicanism, but instead created an '"ntermediate" form of republicanism located in the deliberative
interaction of wise and responsible representatives, see Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31-48 (1985). Sunstein seeks to deny that Madisonianism is
best understood as a realization of Dahlsian pluralism. Id. at 30 & n.6. Thus, while he concedes
the "close practical relationship between the concern for private property and the Madisonian
governmental structure," he assures us that 'the relationship is hardly one of logical necessity."
Id. at 45. Similarly, he concedes that redistribution of wealth was "neither the hope nor the
expectation of the Federalists," but imagines that the representatives chosen through those
Federalist institutional structures might in their "deliberation" opt for redistribution and still
be "consistent with their [the Federalists'] underlying conception of politics and representation
.
" Id. To support his version of that underlying conception, he quotes passages from
Hamilton, see id. at 41, 46, that we think are better understood as expressions of ideology
rather than sincerity.
50. F. COLEMAN, supra note 49, at 154 (quoting Dahl).
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of "natural" and universal reality, rather than a contingent version
created by political theory itself.
The emphasis on Hobbes also punctures reformist fantasy. Hobbes,
at least, was an utter realist, completely and corrosively honest. In contrast, Locke, whom we prefer to claim as one of our intellectual founders,
reinvoked the natural law tradition, even while robbing it of moral

content, to justify what was essentially a Hobbesian view of political

life.5 1 The Lockean conception of inalienable rights rooted in natural

51. Locke was guilty of playing a disingenuous rhetorical game with the reader, while
Hobbes, at least, was intellectually honest. For example, Locke, like Hobbes, refuted the notion
of innate moral ideas. Pointing to the diversity of world views, he took values to be culturally
relative. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING ch. 3, at 6-9
(P. Nidditch ed. 1975). Unlike Hobbes, however, Locke was unwilling to surrender the moral
authority which words like "reason" and 'natural law" provided. Thus, he asserted that while
reason could not be a direct source for a knowledge of morality, it could nonetheless deduce
moral principle from sense impression and experience. Reason could formulate deductions and
intermediate ideas which eventually would lead to important 'truths" about morality and justice
that were almost mathematically demonstrable. Id. ch. 4, at 7. He even advocated conformity
to the general principles of justice which were virtually universal in their application. Id. ch.
28, at 7-13. This curious vacillation runs through Locke's reasoning, making moral truth alternatively "quite uncertain" and 'mathematically demonstrable." See L. STEPHEN, II HISTORY
OF ENGLISH THOUGHT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

72 (1962).

Locke's argument is patently self-contradictory, but in the Natural Law Essays, he underscores the political implications of his redefinition of reason. J. LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW
OF NATURE 161 (W. von Leyden ed. 1954) (1676). While his definition disassociated natural
reason from the divinely sanctioned monarch, it did not distribute natural reason to the people.
Locke is unambiguous on that point:
"ne voice of the people is the voice of God." Surely, we have been taught by
a most unhappy lesson [apparently, the Civil War] how doubtful, how fallacious
this maxim is, how productive of evils, and with . . . what cruel intent this
il-omened proverb has been flung wide [lately] among the common people. Indeed,
if we should listen to this voice as if it were the herald of a divine law, we should
hardly believe there was any God at all. For is there anything so abominable, so
wicked, so contrary to right and law, which the general consent... of a senseless
crowd would not at some time advocate? Hence we have heard of the plunder of
divine temples, the obstinacy of insolence and immorality, the violations of laws,
and the overthrow of kingdoms. And surely if this voice were the voice of God, it
would be exactly the opposite of that first fiat whereby He created and furnished
this world, bringing order out of chaos; nor does God even speak to men in such
a way - unless He should wish to throw everything into confusion again and
reduce it to a state of chaos.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Instead, natural law, the law of reason, is known specifically by those industrious enough
to undertake a thorough inquiry into the "order, array, and motion" of the world, which is "so
regular and in every respect so perfect ...
." Id. at 153. This examination would show that
God not only exists but also intends that people obey law and live in an orderly world. Most
people will of course be too lazy to undertake the industrious study of the world which yields
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law and protecting "liberty" serves to provide a kind of fantasy version
of American life; what we celebrate in the name of property and
freedom is a self-interest 2and avarice best described as an expression
5'
of Hobbesian "appetite.
Likewise, the fiction of "sovereignty of the people," which legitimates a constitutional structure far removed from direct, participatory
democracy, serves to perpetuate the illusion that as Americans we
really do speak as "the people," even though the political reality is
far closer to the alienated, transactional world of Dahl (or Hobbes).
Instead of indulging in reformist fantasies - like the effort to "recover," in a modern, palatable, nonthreatening "liberal" version, a
long-deceased republican tradition - which divert energies and sustain
self delusion, we should confront our Hobbesian reality directly, and
seek to fashion a politics in response. The "liberal" era of constitutional
law, if it ever existed at all, is over. In fact, if ever there were a fit
candidate for "structural amendment ' of the Constitution, it would
be the Nixon/Reagan redirection of the federal courts (from bottom
to top). Those courts are back on track, back in the spirit of both
Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall. The paradigmatic case in
American constitutional jurisprudence is, unfortunately, not Brown v.
Board of Education,6 but Fletcher v. Peck.55
As conservative apologists for the existing order again learn to
celebrate the judicial activism they so vehemently denounced, those
with more progressive agendas must stop playing the supplicant role

an understanding of natural law, although all have an equal opportunity to do so, just as most
people are too lazy to understand geometric principles. Locke did not advocate rule by scientists
and mathematicians alone, however. The real point was wealth, for, like geometric principles,
riches in the Earth are available for all who seek them, "[ylet from this we do not conclude
that all men are wealthy." Id. at 135. Riches do not "present themselves to idle and listless
people," but only to those with the zeal to search them out. Id. Reason, in other words, now
resided with the successful few, not with the monarch or the multitude. Id. It followed, of
course, that those same industrious few should also exercise sovereignty.
Notably, when sovereignty was safely in the hands of the propertied, "rights" as against
sovereignty were not of crucial importance to Locke. J. LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 94 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963); see also F. COLEMAN, supra note 49, at 67-72 (also
describing Locke as adopting essentially Hobbesian premises but surrounding them with more
pleasing rhetoric).
52. From Coleman's perspective, American life may be less "hazardous and short" than the
Hobbesian state of nature, but is nevertheless "solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish." F. COLEMAN,
supra note 49, at 4.
53. The notion of "structural amendment" comes from Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:
Discoveringthe Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).

54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55.

10 U.S. (6 Crunch) 87 (1810).
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before a judiciary that will become more unresponsive before it gets
better, if it ever does, many years from now. And it will never get
better unless we focus on real politics instead of self-indulgently conjuring up sly and rhetorical moves good for only occasional incremental
movement, as, for example, a strong dissenting opinion.
III.
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Despite the best efforts of Michelman and others to locate longburied threads of republicanism in American constitutionalism, the
case for discontinuity, outlined in the preceding section, is stronger.
The institutionalized federal structure, with its crucial incorporation
of the liberal individual rights model, signifies a wholesale rejection
of an authentic republican tradition. Yet, the imagery of popular sovereignty is so powerful that it serves a profound ideological role, as
7
illustrated by Marshall's long passage from McCulloch v. Maryland.5
Instead of taking its ideological traces as reality, one might focus
instead on republicanism's utopian core, the core that makes the idea
of republicanism so appealing. At one time, people very seriously considered the question of how to realize republicanism in practice.
The following sections reintroduce the most hotly debated issues
of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century republican theorists. While
"republicanism" was never unified or consistent enough to yield a
single position on these topics, at least all were up for grabs to an
extent that modern liberals would find disquieting. We will discuss,
in turn, property, membership, representation, and virtue.
A.

Property

Liberal reformers routinely point out that vast disparities of
economic power affect (and distort) the political process. The economically powerful make themselves heard through highly visible methods
that need no surreptitious resort to corruption, although corruption
is also a mainstay of American political life. Current publicity about
congressional ethics, for example, may dampen the zeal in Washington
for shifty money-making schemes, but it will undoubtedly leave intact
the processes of private campaign financing by which the wealthy
legally buy officials their positions. Also, as editorialists often noted

56. See also G. Alexander, Fragmented Survival (Fall 1989) (unpublished Critical Legal
Studies Newsletter, forthcoming). Alexander makes an effective case for discontinuity with
some focus on the early nineteenth century.
57. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819).
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after the last presidential campaign, most Americans feel no particular
stake in the outcome of elections. In the one ritualized exercise of
popular sovereignty available to Americans at the national level the opportunity to choose between the two presidential candidates turnouts are extraordinarily low, and most Americans are otherwise
uninvolved in the political process. Moreover, the level of involvement
drops dramatically depending on where one is situated in the economy:
The wealthy vote, and otherwise enjoy access to the political process,
while the poor tend not even to bother showing up for elections.
These realities are well-known. We stare them in the face, yet
refuse to consider the distribution of wealth as raising a starkly political question. The liberal (anti-republican) split between public and
privates grips our consciousness so firmly that we almost dare not
think of private property as a public issue of sovereignty.5 9
By way of contrast, consider the great republican theorist of England, James Harrington, whose work was so influential in the colonies. In his famous conception of "balance," Harrington unequivocally
linked politics to land distribution. Following Aristotle (and the ancients' "learned disciple Machiavel"),60 he categorized government as
either monarchy, aristocracy, or commonwealth. Ideally, political form
followed the distribution of property. Thus, in a monarchy, one person
would own three quarters of the land (the "over-balance");61 in an
aristocracy, a minority would own the overbalance; and in a commonwealth, the "whole people" would hold the major part of the land.
These normative Aristotelian categories assumed a congruence between the form of government and the distribution of property. In-

58. For a more extended treatment of this subject, see Freeman & Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 259 (1987).
59. Both Sunstein and Michelman, in their versions of republicanism, are willing to deny
property rights a presocial or "exogenous" status. See Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution,
supra note 4, at 1330-37; Sunstein, supra, note 4, at 1549-53. In this respect, they are both in
the grand tradition of liberal legal realists going all the way back to Justice Johnson's famous
opinion (one of four for the majority) in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 271 (1827),
in which John Marshall, who did believe in presocial property rights but was outvoted four to
three, dissented in a constitutional case for the first and only time in his career as Chief Justice.
Id. at 332 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
From our perspective, however, their positions do not really stray outside the modern liberal
tradition. While they surely diverge from radical libertarianism, they both still see law (and
politics) as basically operating alongside a given (and grossly unequal) distribution of wealth,
with hopefully some capacity to tinker with distributional arrangements. However, we view the
core republican insight as this: Distribution is priorto politics, and necessarily the foundation
for politics conceived as a moral enterprise.
60. Harrington, supra note 10, at 162.
61. Id. at 163.
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deed, lack of congruence would cause "confusion." If, for example,
a single ruler attempted to govern as an absolute monarch without
holding at least three-quarters of the property, he would govern by
force rather than "naturally" and could be called a tyrant. Likewise,
an aristocracy holding less than three-quarters of the land would become an "oligarchy," and a republic in which the people did not own
the overbalance would become an anarchy: "[G]overnment not according unto the balance,... is not natural but violent," wrote Harrington,
for those with political power would try to force a commensurate
redistribution of property, or those with an overbalance of land would
try to seize commensurate political power.6 The Harringtonian ideal
was an overbalance already in the hands of the many, followed by a
quiet adjustment of the form of government to a republic (commonwealth), thereafter secured by the enactment of an agrarian law to
prevent any return of the overbalance to the hands of a fewA' He
claimed such limits to ownership were "first introduced by God himself,
who divided the land of Canaan unto his people by lots. ...

."

Notably, Harrington conceded that people would tend to act in
their own self-interest, yet he also argued that politics could transcend
(rather than merely manage) conflict. Politics could rise to the level
of "reason" and "law" in something like the old scholastic sense infusing "soul" into the multitude, making them "incapable of passion." The key to transcending conflict lay in proper political management of property, so as to produce a unity of interest;7 when, through
devices like the agrarian law, the people as a whole shared an interest
in the nation's property, and also exercised sovereignty, the government became a government of laws, not of men.68
A government of laws did not mean a government by fixed legal
formalism, for Harrington thought lawyers should play no role in a
true republic. 69 Law was not abstract form, but relation - specifically,
62.

Id. at 164. Which is surely the case in the contemporary United States, where in 1983,

even before the full impact of the Reagan years, an estimated 10% of households owned 72%
of the wealth. DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, The Concentration
of Wealth in the United States 35 (1986) (based on data, analysis, and assistance provided by

James D. Smith).
63. Harrington, supra note 10, at 164.
64. Id. Radicals made a serious attempt to include such an agrarian law in the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776. See Nash, Smith & Hoerder, Labor in the Era of the American Revolution:
An Exchange, 24 LAB. HIsT. 414, 431-32 (1983); see also G. WOOD, supra note 8, at 64, 89.

65.

Harrington, supra note 10, at 164.

66.

Id. at 838.

67. See id. at 835.
68.
69.

Id. at 401, 838.
Id. at 98.
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the correct relation between property and popular sovereignty. In a
monarchy or aristocracy, even where a "balance" of property and
power exists, laws will be "more private than comes duly up unto law
(the nature whereof lieth not in partiality but in justice).,"7 In contrast,
in a commonwealth, the interest "of the whole people, coming up to
the public interest (which is none other than common right and justice,
excluding all partiality or private interest), may be truly called the
empire of laws and not of men."'
On this point (unlike some others) Harrington was unambiguous.
The correct relation between power and property constituted law:
To come unto civil laws: if they stand one way and the
balance another, it is the case of government which of necessity must be new modelled; wherefore your lawyers, advising
you upon like occasions to fit your government unto their
laws are no more to be regarded than your tailor if he should
desire you to fit your body unto his doublet. There is also
danger in the plausible pretence of reforming the law, except
the government be first good, in which case it is a good tree
and (trouble not yourselves overmuch), bringeth not forth
evil fruit. Otherwise, if the tree be evil, you can never reform
the fruit .... T2
Royalist critics, skeptical of applying the classical conceptions of
republicanism to the realities of seventeenth century England, pointed
to one obvious problem. Harrington's notion of "balance," and the
whole idea of an economically independent citizenry based on republicanism, defined "property" as land. But as the Hobbesian royalist
Wren pointed out, England already possessed many other sources of
wealth.7 According to Wren, it was the early decision to establish
money and a market exchange value for "acquiring and possessing"
goods that in fact necessitated sovereign power. 74 And how could land
remain the basic unit of wealth when the king could derive money
from many sources: rents from land, mining, colonies, duties and customs, and usury? Indeed, according to Wren, even in ancient times,
Aristotle had told of Phaleas, who tried to introduce republican equality through redistribution of land, ignoring other riches - "in all of

70.
71.

Id. at 401.
Id.

72. Id. at 187.
73.

M. WREN, MONARCHY ASSERTED 17-41 (1659).

74.

Id. at 22.
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which He ought to have settled the same Equality or Moderate Proportion, or else altogether to have omitted that Phansie." 75
For a time, some Americans were optimistic about the degree to
which republicanism and at least an entrepreneurial form of capitalism
could coexist,7- but Harrington himself never envisioned republicanism
as other than agrarian. The problem was the one Wren identified:
How could capitalism conform to the need for balance - the need for
the sovereign people to own at least three-quarters of the property?
Gordon and Trenchard, whose articles became the most widely
read English political theory in the American colonies, drew explicitly
upon Harrington, but at the same time celebrated, like Locke, the
process of capital investment and economic development. As with
Locke, the "reason" they hailed was not the reason of natural law
scholasticism, nor the people's "common sense," but, rather, the reason
that served to facilitate industry, acquisition, and exchange:
REASON has invented all Science, pointed out all Commerce, and framed all Schemes for social Happiness. To
REASON we are beholden for all the Comforts and Conveniences of Life ....The Earth with all its Abundance affords
but rude and unpleasing Entertainment, without the Dexterity and Refinements of Reason .... Without REASON we
had lived like the Brute Creation upon raw Fruit, tasteless
Herbs, and cold Spring ....
Gordon and Trenchard followed Harrington, but also reinterpreted
his work to make it consistent with capitalism. They rejected monarchy
and concluded that government should be by and with the consent of
those who took part in the hearty process of market accumulation and

75. Id. at 17-41. Pocock clearly states that Harrington understood republicanism to rest on
a foundation of land, not commercial wealth. Pocock, Forewordto J. HARRINGTON, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON (J. Pocock ed. 1977). In that sense, Wren could dismiss
Harrington as already obsolete. Wren also mocked Harrington for his contrived use of moralistic

language and what Wren took to be his sermonizing, given Harrington's many references to
Scripture. Like Hobbes, Wren saw the words of morality as deluding, as being nothing but
"Words and Names." He called Laws and Liberty 'the only true Charms, that I know of in
Nature, which by the meer sound of Words produce Great and Reall Effects." M. WREN, supra

note 73, at 17-41. The charge seems utterly accurate as against Locke. Whether Harrington
sought a more complicated point about the relationship of morality to a polity's material foundation, a new relationship of mind and matter, is a hard question, which Wren dismissed too quickly.
76. See generally J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790S (1984).

77. J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, INDEPENDENT WHIG No. 35 (Wilkins, Walthoe, Woodward & Peele eds. 1724).
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exchange. In a market economy, monarchy would mean tyranny because of the Harringtonian imbalance. Gordon and Trenchard expended
much rhetoric to describe the "passion" of tyrants, who seized national
wealth by force, for personal and political ends, rather than sensibly
leaving it to the nation for further economic development. But the
passion of tyrants was mirrored by the "passion" of the general public,
who would certainly plunder capital wealth if given political power to
do so: "[e]very Man would be plundering the Acquisitions of another;
the Labour of one Man would be the Property of another; and one
Man's industry would be the cause of another man's idleness." 78 The
fear of plunder verged on paranoia: "For all bodies of Men subsisting
on their own Substance, or upon the Profits of Trade and Industry
... have justly such terrible Apprehensions of Civil Disorders which
destroy every thing that they enjoy .... )279
As good Harringtonians, Gordon, and Trenchard understood that
the task of political theory was to "observe this Fluctuation and
Change" in property relations, and to "adjust the political to it by
precedent Precautions and timely Remedies." Balance attained
through "gentle and insensible Methods"0 would avoid the worst convulsions of civil disruption. Yet Gordon and Trenchard never suggested
a return to Harrington's commonwealth ideal. Indeed, the message
they drew from Harrington was not the republican ideal of popular
sovereignty through shared interest, but a grim and practical lesson:
If the people have political power, they will try to seize property as
well.
Thus, on the eve of American constitutionalism, our framers confronted what they perceived as a Harringtonian nightmare: The people
had too much political power and were using it with lusty vigor to
seize and plunder the property of the few. Those, like Madison and
Hamilton, who recognized that in a growing commercial economy inequality of wealth would be the norm, needed a distinctly un-Harringtonian solution to the problem. The "balance" of aristocracy would too
blatantly repudiate the Revolution, while the "balance" of commonwealth required redistribution to stave off chaos and disorder. The
answer, illustrated so well by Fletcher v. Peck,81 was simultaneously
to distance the people from their sovereignty through the creation of

78.

J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, CATo'S LErERS No. 33 (Wifdns, Walthoe, Woodward

& Peele eds. 1724).
79. Id. at 59.
80. Id. at 85.
81. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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a carefully structured, institutional web of operative political power
while insulating property from sovereignty through the mediating protective wall of the liberal rights model.
Missing from Harrington's careful analysis was the power of ideology to compensate in belief for the absence of balance in fact. Thus,
the people could learn to believe that the Constitution was an expression and retention of their sovereignty and learn to forget that authentic sovereignty presupposed a commensurate distribution of property.
Even more striking is the way we have internalized and normalized
the basic structure of inequality. Implicit in Locke and fully realized
in the nineteenth century is the most powerful and disabling feature
of American individualistic ideology - equality of opportunity - which
presupposes by fiat the legitimacy of acquired wealth and naturalizes
and even celebrates inequality as the just outcome of processes regulated by choice, will, and "talent." Just as wealth distorts political
process, leading to domination by the 'few in the name of the many,
inequality of "cultural" capital serves to distort the claimed procedural
fairness of meritocracy, insuring a reality of power closely akin to
hereditary aristocracy. In either case, the legacy of Harrington for a
modern republican agenda is to remember that the question of distribution cannot be relegated to a sideline of ethics or economics; the
issue is necessarily one of politics.s
B.

Membership

Seventeenth-century theorists knew that the question of membership was crucial to republicanism, for the flip side of republican inclusiveness was its exclusiveness.8 Hobbes could comfortably suppose a

82. For a more detailed and critical treatment of this subject, see Freeman, Racism, Rights,
and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 295, 362-85 (1988).
83. Michelman does try to persuade us that a "republican, inclusionary" vision of property
has lingered to the point where it is rhetorically available to contemporary constitutional discourse. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution,supra note 4, at 1330-34. To be sure, the most
radical, republican (and especially evangelical) versions conceived property as "an extension of
the sovereign will of the people, and therefore subject to whatever controls were necessary to
promote harmony, participation, and equality." Mensch, Religion, Revival, and the Ruling
Class: A Critical History of Trinity Church, 36 BUFFALo L. REV. 427, 470-79 (1987). The
piece recounts how the discredited, pre-Revolutionary established Anglican church in New York,
in the safe and guiding hands of Alexander Hamilton and other New York Federalists, managed
to retain her extensive land holding despite "[t~he egalitarian logic of the Revolution which
challenged virtually every aspect of Trinity's structure." Id. at 471. She succeeded even though
"[h]er very existence seemed inconsistent with revolutionary republicanism." Id. See also
Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property Rights, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 635 (1982).
84. See Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution,supra note 4, at 1330.
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relatively inclusive membership for his "original" convenantors, since
he did not envision their participation in an ongoing political process
with ethical dimension. Those seeking to reform England in the name
of the "people," however, had to decide just who those "people" were.
There is a continuing cautionary message in recalling how obvious it
seemed at the time to exclude women and servants from suffrage.
They were naturally dependents, and as such, politically not "people"
at all. According to classic republicanism, property freed men to take
part in citizenship. As Harrington stated, an estate owner "may have
some servants or a family, and consequently some government, or
something to govern. 8 6 This experience of governing others rendered
the citizen fit to take part in the larger polity. Although somewhat
ambiguous on the point, Harrington seems to have assumed that servants should play no political role., Most republican theorists could
hardly have imagined such a possibility, just as it was beyond the
bounds of male imagination to picture women in the role of vigorous,
arms-bearing republican citizens of the classical description.
Traditional notions of membership were transported to the colonies,
where property qualifications were the norm, and the celebrated republican citizenry was clearly both white and male.88 Blacks, for example, fought in great numbers during the Revolution,1 but how many
whites even today picture the soldier-citizen of the Revolution, the

85. See generally H. DICKINSON, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN 225-58 (1977); C. HILL, The Poor and the People, in III
COLLECTED ESSAYS OF CHRISTOPHER HILL 247-58 (1986).
86. Harrington, supra note 10, at 63.
87. C. HILL, supra, note 85, at 252.
88. The republican rhetoric of the Revolutionary period in America did exert ideological
pressure on the traditional membership/dependency assumptions concerning women. Predictably,
however, the equalitarian potential of that pressure was carefully contained by the dominant
culture, chiefly through the redefinition of the family as an autonomous sphere within which
women could experience some degree of authority, but within which they were also to be
confined. See, e.g., J. FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY 1750-1800 (1982); M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING
THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985); L. KERBER,
WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
(1980); M. NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800 (1980); M. SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY
AMERICA (1986).
89. See M. GROSS, THE MINUTEMEN AND THEIR WORLD 151 (paperback ed. 1976). While
the classical republican ideal had been the arms-bearing citizen-soldier whose property ownership
gave him a stake in defending the polity, the actual "citizens" of the young republic were
apparently content to let the landless do the bulk of the fighting. By 1778 the Revolution was
being fought principally by landless younger sons, the permanent poor, and by blacks. Id.
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prototypical republican ideal, as having black skin? The framers, recognizing these unresolved membership problems, delegated the issue
of voter qualifications to the states. Property qualifications were only
gradually removed over the first four decades of the nineteenth century.9 The Dorr rebellion in Rhode Island was in fact occasioned by
the Rhode Island Legislature's refusal to modify a system that limited
the franchise, as well as jury service and access to courts, to male
freeholders and their eldest sons. Yet even the Dorrites, who with
their People's Constitution, were trying to reclaim the state in the
name of "the people" and true republicanism, decided to limit their
franchise to white males. 91 And how can one forget one of the most
shameful instances in American constitutional history, the decision
that Native Americans were not part of the polity, and therefore not
entitled to sue in federal courts as "citizens"? In so denying the
claim, John Marshall invoked the classic language of dependency:
[T]hey are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
They look to our government for protection; rely upon
its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their
93
wants; and address the president as their great father.
Of course, property qualifications for voting were gradually removed. This inclusionary move usually hailed as unambiguously progressive, also served to mask the dilemma posed by the coexistence
of a supposedly republican form of government and an economically
dependent work force. Under ideological pressure, independence was
redefined for citizenship purposes, not as property ownership but as
the legal right to sell one's labor for wages. For a time in the early
nineteenth century, pauper exclusions from voting emerged: Paupers,
unlike wage earners, could not support themselves and were therefore
singled out for their dependency. The theoretical independence of wage
earners was defined by the dependency of paupers, and the binary
split between them mediated the tension produced by the power of

90. See Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 335 (1989).
91. As a trade-off for their disenfranchisement, nonvoters were exempted from taxation

and militia duty. Frederick Douglass, the abolitionist and ex-slave, was not impressed. See G.
DENNISON, supra note 36, at 44.
92.
93.

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1831).
Id. at 17. For an excellent discussion of Cherokee Nation and the other Marshall Court

cases involving Indian tribal status, see Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 ABF
RES. J. 3, 23-34.
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property owners in a society where all were supposed to be free. Once
property had been relegated to a realm of privacy and had taken on an
essentially apolitical character, dependence equated only with the legal
category of pauperism. 94 The eventual disappearance of even that category, and with it pauper voting restrictions, may have been a triumph
of democratic inclusiveness, but in another sense it also marked the
triumph of liberalism and the death of republicanism, for it meant
that the economy could be defined as wholly private and essentially
irrelevant to the question of sovereignty.
The Civil War and the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments formally, at least, resolved racial membership issues; inclusion of women
came much later with the nineteenth amendment. Those who seek to
resurrect the republican tradition, however, cannot afford to be complacent about membership questions, for the problems they raise essentially problems of territoriality and hierarchy - are central to
the tradition itself.
As Professor Levinson's essay points out, the process of assigning
the franchise to citizens within any single geographically defined nation-state is neither logical nor functional2- Inevitably, the rules break
down at the margins. Inherently arbitrary membership criteria serve
to exclude people who have a substantial stake in the outcome of state
decisionmaking. "Marginal" categories include undocumented "aliens,"
people who routinely cross borders for work, people who live in metropolitan areas that sprawl across national boundaries, and Mexicans
who work in American factories set astride the border to take advantage of peculiar American laws.
The territorial problem, however, lies not just at the margins. In
a world in which the economic and political policies of a nation-state
like the United States can affect deeply the lives of people abroad
(many of whom labor to provide Americans with their abundance of
wealth), the utter exclusion of "foreigners" from the American franchise seems grotesque. In Central America, after all, people suffer torture and death for United States policies on which they cannot vote,
yet their exclusion seems no less "natural" than did the exclusion of
women in the seventeenth century. Our debt and environmental
policies and our mismanagement of the environment create devastation
in the Third World, where people daily bear the costs of the "externalities" we have imposed.9 We proudly remember the American col-

94.
95.
549-58
96.

For an insightful and detailed description of this process, see Steinfeld, supranote 90.
See Levinson, Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 545,
(1989).
For a current summary of such effects, see L. BROWN, STATE OF THE WORLD (1989).
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onists' refusal to be taxed without representation. Yet a Third World
demand for representation in the American polity (given the economic
equivalence of tax and externality) would no doubt unleash a paranoia
as intense as did the spectre of working class suffrage during the
eighteenth century.
The goal of classical republicanism, however, was not more territorial inclusiveness - world citizenship - but less. It may, of course,
simply be too late to propose a return to small units of governance,
such as town meetings, as a way of running a world characterized by
multinational corporations and nuclear missiles. No unit is small
enough to avoid affecting the larger world, or to remain unaffected
by it. Yet the nation-state may be a less stable entity than we have
supposed. Recent events in the Soviet Union illustrate the fragility
of the supposed assimilation of ethnic and geographic pluralism into
a single monolithic unit, while starkly geographical differences in election results in our last presidential election suggest a less dramatic
but similar Balkanization in the United States.
Can a modern version of republicanism deal with both the interconnectedness and the geographical polarization that exists in the United
States? The republican agenda includes an effort to revitalize local
politics, where face-to-face participation is still at least a possibility.
But to extol the virtues of local autonomy is to raise almost immediately some hard questions about the nature and meaning of community in our culture. Given the starkly geographical way in which
status and wealth are distributed in America, localism run rampant
would reinforce. the selfish, hierarchical, exclusionary, and even colonial, character of existing land use and local governmental arrangements.
Perhaps the most "republican" Supreme Court decision of the past
two decades was Milliken v. Bradley,97 which affirmed local autonomy

97. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). However, to characterize the Court's recent decision, in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989), as "republican" strains credulity, despite
Professor Farber's facile effort, Farber, Richmond and Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REv. 623
(1989), to turn Michelman on his head by doing so. In the best republican tradition, the City
of Richmond, through its deliberative political process; chose to redistribute property (in the
form of access to government contracts) so as to make its process more economically and
politically inclusionary. The Supreme Court, in the tradition of Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810), deployed a liberal rights-based trump, in the form of property rights (vested
expectations of contractual access) in the guise of equality rights (as if "reverse discrimination"
had anything to do with egalitarianism). The Court insisted that such rights could be modified
only through something tantamount to the judicialladjudicatory process usually required by
courts (traditional guardians against the redistributional passions of the rabble). See generally,
id. at 130-39.
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(of the suburbs around Detroit) as a cherished constitutional value;
the instrumental result was to render those suburban boundaries inviolable for the purpose of desegregating Detroit's school system. What
is striking about the decision is that happenstance jurisdictional units
are touted as instances of community autonomy. Such units, largely
the product of historical whimsy, were empty forms (perhaps experienced as something more like community when sparsely settled), given
content through racial segregation and hierarchical exclusion. 8 Against
this background, it is difficult to find republican solace in cases like
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,9 Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,1°° Holt Civic
Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,0 1 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 102 City of
Memphis v. Greene, °3 or Village of Belle Terre v. Booras,'0 all of
which protected the integrity of local political processes against rightsbased federal constitutional challenges. Ironically, such deferential outcomes might be defensible (and even admirable) in a context where
one felt a lot less queasy about community membership rules. Like it
or not, we have to learn to talk about the difference between alienated
and authentic community. 05

98. See generally K. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
(1985) (development of suburbs as insular enclaves). For a prescient judicial
perception of the problem, see Vickers v. Glouchester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 242-43, 181 A.2d
129, 140 42 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting).
99. 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976) (referendum approval for rezoning).
100. 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977) (suburb's denial of rezoning for low-income housing did
not raise inference of racial discrimination despite racially disproportionate effect, evidence of
some racist motive, and fact that of 64,000 residents of town, only 27 were black).
101. 439 U.S. 60, 68-70 (1978) (members of local polity entitled, exclusively, to "extraterritorial," virtually colonial, powers).
102. 446 U.S. 55, 61-65 (1980) (at-large voting rooted in progressive era reform sustained
despite fact that blacks - who were 30% of the community - had never elected a black under
the at-large system).
103. 451 U.S. 100, 120-24 (1981) (city decision to close street at behest of residential neighborhood seeking reduction in traffic flow upheld, despite fact it was an all-white neighborhood
blocking largely black 'traffic").
104. 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974) (upholding local decision limiting "unrelated" families to two
persons only).
105. For a serious, and empirically-rooted, contemporary effort to grapple with such issues,
see generally M. TAYLOR, COMIUNITY, ANARCHY & LIBERTY 1-10, 33-38, 95-139, 150-71
(1982). For a long and careful argument on behalf of a communitarian as opposed to a libertarian
vision of social life, see G. Alexander, Dilemas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations
and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. __ (forthcoming, 1989).
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Representation

Representation is a metaphysical puzzle, a presence by virtue of
an absence. 1' The representative who claims to speak with the "voice
of the people" cannot really do so. The claim is always fictitious, no
less now than when the king supposedly spoke with the voice of God.
In fact, representation is required precisely because neither God nor
the people can speak for themselves.
The gap between represented and representatives is fully transcended only in the religious tradition, through the mythic concept of
embodiment. The most intense example, of course, is Christ: in his
actual body he was said to be both God and human, and, some said,
he was human in the sense of being all people. Thus could his particular
sacrifice become the basis for a universal redemption. Neither kings
nor popes claimed to speak for God in the sense of the real embodiment
claimed for Christ; nor did seventeenth-century English parliamentarians, for that matter, claim to embody the people in the fullest sense,
for that, too, would have presumed the role of Christ himself. Thus,
true representation as embodiment must remain mythic. No secular
version exists. For any worldly authority to speak in such terms is
simply blasphemous.
By the seventeenth century, however, worldly authorities had
moved to secularize the mythic, making merely representative what
was once embodiment. It was then that the modern notion of the
representative person, or "public person," first emerged, both in theology and in politics. Adam represented the whole of humanity; because
of his sin we all sinned. Christ, as our representative, paid for our
sins on our behalf, almost as our agent (or lawyer?). This emphasis
on Adam and Christ as representative figures coincided with the
legalist version of covenant theology; because of Christ's suffering "for
us," we were entitled to salvation, for the terms of God's covenant
had been satisfied. Not surprisingly, the vocabulary of the covenant
closely paralleled the emerging legal vocabulary of contracting on the
market. God was creditor; we were debtor; as our representative,
10 7
Christ pays the debt, and we can claim our contract rights.
We now forget, of course, how naturally theology and politics once
intersected in the question of representation. Even Locke, the great

106. A. Katz, Representing 47-48 (unpublished manuscript, available in SUNY/Buffalo
School of Law Library) (an extraordinary reflection on the complexities of representation).
107. See C. HILL, Covenant Theology and the Concept of a 'Public Person', in III COLLECTED ESSAYS OF CHRISTOPHER HILL, supra note 85, at 300-19 (1986); see also P. MILLER,
THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 401-08 (1939).
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liberal, felt obligated to spend much of the First Treatise disputing
Adam's original dominion over the natural world, a dominion that
Adam supposedly handed down to subsequent kings as his successors
in representation. 10 This was a crucial first step in establishing a less
patrimonial and more possessive conception of property and a more
contractual conception of government.
In both religion and politics, parallel problems emerged as theorists
increasingly turned the notion of representation into something more
secular and contractarian than mythic. Most theorists, for example,
delicately obscured a central question: Who is represented? Puritans
were convinced that, of course, only the "elect" (i.e., "chosen of God")
were saved, and in that sense Christ represented some, not all. Similarly, seventeenth-century parliamentarians began claiming to represent "the people," never for a moment supposing they represented
the poor in anything but the most tenuously "virtual" sense. Radicals
of the seventeenth century, however, insisted that representation was
something closer to true embodiment, which necessarily means an
insistence on inclusion. A Christ who is all of us, in his suffering,
includes within himself the least as well as the greatest. So, too, a
parliament that "is" us must embody all of us in some direct and
"actual" sense, not indirectly and artificially. Or, even more extremely
(except for the instance of Christ) only the people can speak in their
own name. Representation, in all of its artificiality, can never be an
adequate substitute for the people themselves. 10 9
That claim, combined with the core Christian notion of Christ as
our embodiment and not just our artificial "representative," became
the basis for seventeenth-century millennial thought. Thus the voice
of the people, and only the voice of the people, became the voice of
God on earth. Anyone who claimed thereafter to "represent" us was
just an artificial and meddlesome intermediary. These were the radical
political claims that so frightened Hobbes. "10 While other royalists
scrambled to shore up some conception of the Crown as embodiment
of all the people, Hobbes was more honest: representation is both
absolutely required and inescapably artificial,"' Without the sovereign
as representative, unity and order dissolve; the people, in all their

108.
109.

J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1967).
C. HILL, supra note 85.

110. They were, to be sure, a 'turbulent, seditious, and factious people." C. HILL, A
TINKER AND A POOR MAN: JOHN BuNYAN AND His CHURCH, 1628-1688, at 4 (1988). See
generally C. HILL, supra note 85; C. HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN (1972).
111. See T. HOBBES, supra note 14, ch. XVI, at 133; see also H. PITRIN, THE CONCEPT
OF REPRESENTATION 14-37 (paperback ed. 1972).
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multiplicity, can never be the voice of God, but only the voice of
disparate appetite. Hobbes created no fantasy about the artificial unity
of representation as any sort of mythic embodiment; it was simply
the people's surrender to secular institutionalism. Hobbes' insistence
on the artificiality of representation, says Christopher Hill, marks the
beginning of modern political theory.112
To an extraordinary degree, however, old, pre-Hobbesian notions
linger; the triumph of representation as pure Hobbesian artificiality
could never be complete, or else we might all be contented royalists.
We still, after all, engage in the ritualized process of "election": the
people stand in, in choosing the "elect," as the only legitimate substitute for God. The discomfiting incompleteness of the Hobbesian
triumph accounts, in turn, for a number of the dilemmas that plague
our modern theory of representation. For example, still unresolved is
the problem of the "virtual" and the "actual." If the people retained
their sovereignty, then is not their actual consent required for every
act of representation? Some communities after the American Revolution took this view and hauled their representatives home whenever
they deviated from specifically drawn instructions. 13 This implied no
surrender of sovereignty at all, and in extreme form meant that no
authority could be exercised over or against the people. Wren, the
astute royalist, succinctly summed up the resultant state of affairs:
"That Representative not having the Sovereign power, there is not
any such power and strength, which . . . implies the absence of all
government."1

Yet by what theory could a representative legitimately claim to
represent "virtually" (rather than actually)? Americans had rejected
virtual representation when the English Parliament claimed to virtually represent the colonists even though no colonists were members
of parliament. Has not the representative who substitutes her own

112. See C. HILL, supra note 85, at 319.
113. See G. WOOD, supra note 8, at 188-96.
114. See generally M. WREN, supra note 73, at 86. Harrington believed no less than the
Federalists that a natural aristocracy would emerge. See Pocock, supra note 10, at 66. He
proposed a division of function, so that the Senators would "propose" and the Assembly would
"choose." Id. at 67. Harrington called this division the difference between debate and result,
id. at 66, likening it to a schoolgirl game, where one girl cuts a cake while the other gets first

choice of the pieces. Id. at 65. Wren had no patience with the notion of a natural aristocrat:
"Is it not much more Naturall to every Man to think himself Wise enough to advise about his
own Affaires, and to suspect all Persons of a greater Reach then himself?" He considered the

debate and result notion just a confusion of sovereignty theory. M. WREN, supra note 64, at
53-54.
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judgment for the judgment of the representative's electors assumed
sovereignty, so that the representatives, taken as a whole, become
sovereign over the people? This is satisfactory only if representatives
form an aristocracy of virtue and wisdom. Such aristocrats are the
natural aristocrats whom even the Federalist framers and Harrington
(anticipating Burke) envisioned as their leaders. 115
Notably, however, Madison refused to place his faith in representation as such. Certainly the republic differed from a democracy precisely by the fact of representation, which allowed the republic to
encompass a broad geographical area, thereby filtering out undesirable
effects of direct rule by the factious people. Nevertheless, as Madison
warned ominously, "[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the
helm." 1 6 For Madison, the real meaning of representation lay in the
separation of institutions, the careful formal structure by which factious interests are "broken," "controlled," and "balanced" against each
other to produce "stability."1 17 Thus, for Madison, representation was
really the institutionalization of interests: a way of bringing together
sources of conflict in a central forum for balancing and stalemating.
In that sense, representation for Madison required no choice between
actual and virtual, for it really meant the institutional arrangement
of the federal government. It is only through the affirmation of this
Hobbesian artificiality that the otherwise problematic choice becomes
immaterial.
Because we take our particular system of representation so much
for granted, we forget that in our history theories of representation
were once hotly debated. Calhoun (who morally discredited himself
forever by championing slavery) nevertheless understood with some
astuteness the tenuous nature of representational claims. Calhoun recognized the dangers posed by a large national bureaucracy, especially
given its tendency to align itself with a "separate monied interest,"' 8
and he witnessed the growth of political parties ready to sacrifice
principle and honesty in the manipulative scramble for votes. In response, he sometimes simply yearned for rule by the natural (propertied) aristocracy (of which he clearly counted himself a member). But

115. See Pocock, supra note 1, at 149 (on the importance of the belief in the natural
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he also understood that Madisonianism posed hard theoretical problems
of representation. The larger the community, he pointed out, the
greater the potential for oppression, especially since Madisonianism
rested on rule by simple numerical majorities. Calhoun argued that if
Madison's real concern had revolved around "interests," a concern
with which Calhoun absolutely agreed, then the nation, and any separate locality within it, ought to be understood as composed of separate,
identifiable interests."m For Calhoun, of chief importance were class
and geographical differences. To prevent oppression of any majority,
he proposed a rule of representation requiring a "concurrent majority,"'120 meaning that government action could proceed only with the
agreement of a majority of the representatives of each interest; any
single interest would have an effective veto over government action.
Like any good republican theorist, Calhoun was able to point to
models from antiquity and classical theory to support his view. Notably, he also cited the model of the Iroquois Nations. In that federation,
absolute unanimity of the separate nations was required, for the goal
was formation of real community, not just surrender to those representing the majority interest.121
Calhoun was not alone in looking to the Iroquois as an ideal republican model against which American constitutionalism should be measured. The League of the Iroquois, formed between AD 1000 and 1400
under a constitution called the Great Law of Peace, extended from
New England to the Mississippi.' By the time Europeans arrived,
the Iroquois had already achieved a successful combination of democracy and federalism, rooted in a relationship to nature that was at
once more spiritual and more practical than most Europeans could
comprehend. Benjamin Franklin consistently and vigorously argued
that American colonists should enact the Iroquois model of federalism
in detail, but most founding fathers were not prepared to incorporate
all aspects of the Iroquois representational structure.' For example,
Iroquois women had the power of impeachment: If an elected leader
(Sachem) behaved improperly or lost the confidence of the people, the
women of his clan impeached him and chose a new sachem." Nevertheless, a number of specific features of American constitutionalism, with
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no real European counterpart, were drawn from the Iroquois. 1' It is
a testament to the usual presumption of Western culture that those
who now seek to recover 'the republican tradition in America" are
looking only to European sources, apparently ignoring as primitive
and irrelevant (despite its marked influence) what may be the single
most successful republic in history.
In response to our concern with the theoretical problems of representation, one might accuse us of fussing in the face of pragmatic
institutions that accommodate varied interests in a pluralist society.
But the problems we raise are not merely theoretical: We live and
experience these contradictions in our daily lives and they have much
to do with why many people find our politics (and much of our social
existence) remote, alien, and devoid of meaning.
Take, for example, the question of self-interest, which is as current,
as the extraordinary greed that characterized the recent Housing and
Urban Development scandal, or as problematic as the debate over
congressional ethics. We are taught to believe that we should pursue
selfish goals, for economic individualism is what America is all about.
Combined with the subjectivity of values that supposedly marks our
basic stance toward ethical issues (though no one really believes this),
our vision of representation becomes one of electing those who will
best pursue our selfish, private interests. Our theoretical framework
leaves no room for an independent vision of the public good. Similarly,
the self-interest of the legislative representative centers on reelection
and securing material gain to compensate for the foregone opportunities during years of public service. Given an economically unequal
society and the utility of wealth in securing reelection, the representative must advance the interests of his or her most powerful constituents. The line that purports to separate corruption from acceptable
practice is arbitrary, not unlike the line for duress in contract law:
by segregating corrupt practices from sanctioned ones, it serves chiefly
to legitimate those left unchallenged. Unless current scandals call into
question the underlying ideology of self-interest, government reforms
will be no more than capricious exercises in line-moving.
The notion of "interest" not only blurs the line between its private
sense and its public one, but also confuses our individual and group
identities. As voters, we are theoretically individual rights-bearers.
Although we may occasionally enter into alliances with others when
interests seem to coincide, rights are not supposed to attach to groups
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as such. Reality, however, contradicts this supposition; group identities may be more significant, experientially, than the mere sum of
atomic individuals. The paradigm case in American culture is race, a
group identity thrust upon an oppressed minority to facilitate and
normalize oppression. Once we recognize that minority racial groups
are made up of victims of discrimination and include that reality in
the political process, we must, despite Professor Alexander's remarks
to the contrary, 6 mandate proportional representation to assure that
group interests will in fact be represented.m
To place race first on the agenda of proportionality simply recognizes that in that area we have made at least a tentative constitutional
and statutory commitment to eliminating "discrimination" in voting.
The idea of proportional or interest-based representation need not be
so confined. For if simple numerical majorities overrepresent those
with economic power through manipulative elections based on the
purchase of imagery, we might well reconsider the basis of representation. To the extent we live our lives not as atomic units, but as
members of ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, perhaps we
would be better represented in those capacities.
It is an ultimate and ironic testament to the unsatisfactory nature
of representation as mere artificiality that the most successful modern
politicians are those who seem to "embody" the people and take on
their mythic identity. Ronald Reagan is surely an example, for he
seemed to incorporate all the cherished illusions of American national
life so fully that his particular policies were irrelevant to his role as
"true representative.'m For those oppressed by Reagan's policies the
phenomenon seemed, rightly, a dangerous one, although tamer than
other modern examples of representation as mythic embodiment: Hitler as mythic embodiment of the German Volk or Lenin's "vanguard
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party" as embodiment of the proletariat. Those examples suggest that
we leave unresolved the metaphysics of representation only at our
peril.
D.

Virtue

Without questioning their good faith, we think that the proponents
of neo-republicanism are part of a continuing and fruitless effort to
shore up the incoherent and morally empty claims of liberal legalism.
As such, they are atop a tradition going back to post-World War II
efforts along similar lines, which culminated in the "legal process"
school with its peculiar combination of "institutional competence" (still
reflected in pieces like the Alexander essay) and "reasoned elaboration. '" Under siege since the 1970s from the simplistic reductionism
of the law and economics school and the despairing nihilism of some
critical legal theorists,1 ° defenders of liberal constitutionalism have
conjured new theories with increasing frequency. Failing to capture
the terrain with either "shared values" or "neo-interpretivism,1' 31 they
followed with the "hermeneutic ploy,",-- which recast the process as
one of dialogic engagement. The "republican" emphasis on deliberation
offers a broader institutional context for this notion.
The basic problem with this republicanism, unlike its rich historical
tradition, is that it is recast to accommodate the continuing assumptions of liberal constitutionalism even though it purports to be other
than 'liberal."' Thus it tells us we can move from strategic self-interest to a "deliberative" version of the same. In both cases, the
subjectivity of values remains the rule, the latter offering a new mediation in the form of deliberative process.
This is hardly surprising, since liberal culture does not offer a
vocabulary for talking about issues of virtue, issues of good and evil.
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Such issues usually arise in religious or spiritual contexts, which liberal
legalism relegates (and trivializes in so doing) to privatized realms.
Such privatization would seem strange to the republicans of the seventeenth century, whose political theory was inextricably rooted in theology as well. 134 Predictably, contemporary republicans work to distance
themselves from those roots, reaffirming religion as a private right
to be kept in the closet and treating almost as a bad joke that one
might want to take, say, "Calvinism," seriously. 1H
The reality is that religion does not stay in the closet; it has no
meaning unless it speaks to issues like our relationship to one another
in communities. This observation would be hardly surprising, except
for the fact that we are living in a time warp. As historical actors,
we universalize our own moment and project its absence onto other
times as a measure of their deficiency. We therefore readily and complacently forget that, for most of American history (including Native
American history), religion has been central to the political quest for
a morally and spiritually satisfying life.136 To be sure, we are a
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"pluralistic" society, but that may not mean that we should continue
to privatize our pluralism and mask it with the veneer of an assimilationist culture that is as devoid of meaning as the shopping malls
that serve as its temples.
Our modern, secular culture has combined positivist science, instrumental rationality, and process pluralism to bring us a world on the
verge of environmental disaster and nuclear armageddon, a world of
poverty and emptiness for too many of us, existing alongside a self-indulgent materialism that celebrates greed as its only substantive value.
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the most common
mode of republican discourse was the decidedly nonprocess-oriented
jeremiad, during which the people were reminded how far short they
fell from the requirements of true republican virtue. In modern
America, the political right has exploited the issue of "virtue," tapping
a deeply felt anxiety about the problem of moral emptiness in a polity
dedicated to nothing more than the careful management of interestgroup acquisitiveness. People almost sense, it seems, a need for the
jeremiad.
To insist on a hegemonic secular culture in the face of that need
simply alienates those whose experience is negated by that culture,
creating a politics of frustration and rage. The Republican Party has
cleverly pandered to the alienated with inflated, patriotic rhetoric and
a manipulative focus on abortion, the one issue upon which many
people seem, perhaps distortedly, to project their desire for a less
self-indulgent society. The liberal Democrats simply turn the other
way, embarrassed by the "God talk," and hoping, somehow, to perfect
the political process so completely as to suppress and deny the reality
of moral conflict. Yet, we may already be witnessing the death of
liberal pluralism, as we move into savagely warring camps over issues
like abortion, homosexuality, and race. Is it possible to fashion a more
substantive form of pluralism?
Central to a substantive pluralism must be a recovery of difference,
in place of the false, abstracted pretense of similarity. Difference
speaks with many voices, some so starkly sectarian as to unhinge
liberal rationalist listeners. Nevertheless, we cannot retreat behind
essentialist universals that deny and mask the richness and irreducible
particularity of human experience, while hierarchically privileging the
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rationalist orthodoxy of an elite few. Detail defeats ideology 37 including
the ideology of secular rationalism. At the same time, we cannot accept
the familiar and defensive sectarian close-out that simply deploys "it's
my religion" as an unanswerable trump. Instead, as real republicans,
we may need to create a context of mutual respect for voices that
seek to name virtue. In short, we must recover the tradition of feisty
theological debate.
Today even legal scholars are recognizing that there are some
specific issues we cannot address without resort to religious discourse. 1' As Milner Ball has said, "if not theology, what? 139 From
our current vantage point, of course, a serious theological discussion
of public issues seems almost unimaginable, for we are inevitably stuck
inour own historical moment, a moment in which both "God" and "the
people" have been effectively eliminated from the bounds of acceptable
discourse: liberalism flattens our language, forcing it into the confines
of a safe middle ground. Harrington, for one, insisted on the Biblical
vocabulary, and searched through Scripture for an understanding of
the commonwealth. At the same time, he reconceptualized that vocabulary in terms that called for a new understanding of the relation
between the material world and a realm that was once both political
and spiritual. We can now barely comprehend what he might have
meant.

137. See Talk of the Town: Notes and Comment, The New Yorker, Aug. 21, 1989, at 23-24.
For an especially thoughtful discussion of substantive pluralism, see H. Cox, MANY MANSIONS,
A CHRISTIAN'S ENCOUNTER WITH OTHER FAITHS (1988). Cox takes as a given the decline

of secularism and addresses the reality of religious pluralism in all its sectarian particulatiry.
138.

See K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 30-84,

173-95 (1987). For an "emphatically anti-liberal" celebration and extension of the same point,
see Perry, Comment on The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction:
ProtectingAnimals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1067 (1986); see also M.
PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 180-84 (1988).
139.

M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY 124 (1985).

For the rich and moving context of the quote, see id. at 3-20, 119-38.

